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Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect
Benefits From, ‘‘Moralistic’’ Punishment
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Abstract
‘‘Moralistic’’ punishment of free riders can provide a beneficial reputation, but the immediate behavior is costly to the punisher. In
Study 1, we investigated whether variation in status would be perceived to offset or mitigate the costs of punishment. One
hundred and nineteen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants predicted
whether punishment would occur, how successful it would be, and indicated their attitude to the punisher. Participants believed
only intervention by a high-status (HS) individual would be successful and that low-status (LS) individuals would not intervene at
all. HS individuals predicted to punish successfully were seen as more formidable and likable. Study 2 investigated whether
punishment was necessary to maintain an HS position. One hundred and seventeen participants were presented with a vignette
describing a punishment scenario. Participants were asked to indicate whether they wished to be led by the punisher. HS indi-
viduals who did not punish were less likely to be chosen as leaders compared to HS punishers, whereas LS individuals who
punished were no more or less likely to be chosen than nonpunishers. The results of both studies suggest that only HS individuals
are expected to punish, likely because such a position offsets some of the costs of punishment. As a result, only HS individual can
access the reputation benefits from punishment. Furthermore, an HS position may be dependent on the willingness to punish
antisocial behavior. The ramifications that these results may have for the evolution of moralistic punishment are discussed.
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‘‘Moralistic’’1 punishment, where an individual punishes the
unfair, antisocial, or otherwise group detrimental behavior of
another, has been shown to promote cooperative and prosocial
behavior (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Fehr & Ga¨ch-
ter, 2000). Punishment can promote such behavior even if it is
delayed, whether in this life (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010) or the
next (McKay, Efferson, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2010), and the
mere presence of a third-party punisher can encourage proso-
cial activity (Halevy & Halali, 2015; Kim, Smith, & Brigham,
1998). While the group as a whole can benefit from the coop-
erative environment provided by punishment (e.g., Ga¨chter,
Renner, & Sefton, 2008), individuals who punish can be
exploited by second-order free riders (Yamagishi, 1988), that
is, group members who cooperate but do not pay the costs of
punishment. Such exploitation, and other costs such as counter-
punishment (Dreber & Rand, 2012), means the evolution of
punishment as a mechanism to enforce cooperation remains
difficult to explain (see West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007).
Reputational Benefit of Punishment
This picture changes if punishers can gain from their actions.
One mechanism is through reputation. Theoretical models
demonstrate that reputational gains can allow punishment to
evolve (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Santos, Rankin, &Wede-
kind, 2011). Experimentally, punishers are found to be valued
as social and sexual partners (Barclay, 2006; Farthing, 2005;
Gordon, Madden, & Lea, 2014) and can be seen as trustworthy
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(Barclay, 2006; Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016).
Indeed, potential punishers seem to be sensitive to the presence
of an audience (Bering, 2008; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brien,
2007; but see Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011).
While the aforementioned suggests that punishers are loved
by observers, this might not be the case. Reputation may be
important for the evolution of punishment, but the reputation
generated by punishment does not have to be an amiable one,
that is, as a ‘‘nice’’ person (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001);
punishers may instead be feared. For example, observers rate
moralistic punishers to be equally as aggressive as individuals
who engage in other, nonmoralistic, confrontational behavior
(Gordon et al., 2014). While moralistic punishment is rarely
characterized in the literature as an antagonistic act per se, any
punishment—certainly in prestate societies (Mathew & Boyd,
2011) or informal settings (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, &
Dovidio, 2009)—will inevitably involve individuals personally
confronting the antisocial behavior of another. Any sort of
confrontational behavior can act as a deterrent against future
aggression from others (Benard, 2013) and individuals are less
likely to cheat a punisher out of fear of retribution (Brandt,
Hauert, & Sigmund, 2003). In fact, unless the motivations of
the punisher are clear, observers are most likely to fear them
(Raihani & Bshary, 2015).
Thus, on the one hand, punishers seem to be well liked, as
they are trustworthy and can eliminate free riding. But, on the
other, punishing shows personal formidability and indicates
they should be treated with deference in any future interactions.
Barriers to Reputation Benefits
Regardless of any later returns from reputation, the immediate
costs of punishment still represent a significant barrier. Firstly,
experimentally punishment often needs to be cheap and effec-
tive, that is, for the ratio between the resources spent on punish-
ment and those removed from the target to be low (for a review,
see Balliet et al., 2011; see also, Egas & Riedl, 2008; Nikifor-
akis & Normann, 2008). While some punishment does occur at
a high fee/fine ratio (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005), this
ratio does not promote cooperation or deter free riding, as it
is not seen as a deterrent (e.g., Markussen, Putterman, & Tyran,
2011; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). From an observer point-
of-view, punishers who fail, insomuch as they do not alter the
behavior of the target, are still well liked (Gordon et al., 2014),
but given a choice, it is likely individuals would associate with
punishers who could actually defend the public good (includ-
ing themselves); both punishers may be interpersonally nice,
but the latter is useful.
Secondly, perhaps the greatest cost to punishment is from
retaliation/counterpunishment (Dreber & Rand, 2012), where
the target of punishment responds in kind. When retaliation is
possible in experiments, punishment is reduced (Cinyabuguma,
Page, & Putterman, 2006; Nikiforakis, 2008). The threat of
retaliation is a prime factor preventing otherwise cost-free pun-
ishment behavior, such as reporting criminal activity (Tarling
& Morris, 2010) and might explain why direct moralistic
punishment occurs far less frequently in nonstate compared
to state societies (Hill, Barton, & Hurtado, 2009; Marlowe
et al., 2008).
Simply put, any account of the reputational benefits gener-
ated bymoralistic punishment must consider two factors. Firstly,
conceptually, how a punisher can (a) cheaply inflict costs on the
target and (b) survive, or at least believe they can withstand, any
potential retaliation long enough to capitalize on those benefits.
Secondly, and specifically for the current research, whether the
expectations and opinions of observers are sensitive to these
costs when making decisions about punishers.
Who Punishes?
Not all individuals experience the same costs of punishment,
and such variation has implications for cooperation and punish-
ment (Olson, 1965; for a recent review, see Singh & Boomsma,
2015). Theoretically, punishment could evolve if some individ-
uals can punish more cheaply than others (de Weerd & Ver-
brugge, 2011). Experimentally, heterogeneity in the cost of
punishment does induce cooperation (Bone & Raihani, 2015;
Nikiforakis, Normann, &Wallace, 2009). It has been suggested
that such heterogeneity can be the result of arbitrary proximate
factors (Przepiorka & Diekmann, 2013). However, we suggest
that status, or rather an individual’s position in a social hier-
archy,2 might provide a consistent source of heterogeneity in
the cost of punishment.
Firstly, individuals in a high-status (HS) position can punish
more effectively, insomuch as they can inflict greater costs on
the target physically (Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009) or use
their position to limit or deny access to resources (Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Maner &Mead, 2010). HS indi-
viduals also have a more extensive social network, and this can
lower costs through the use of coalitional aggression and the
ease with which it can be coordinated; in nonstate societies, the
punishment of norm violations is coordinated and executed by
individuals with strong coalition support (von Rueden, Gurven,
Kaplan, & Stieglitz, 2014).
Secondly, we argue that HS individuals would also be at less
risk from retaliation. Dominance is traditionally recognized by
the fact an opponent yields without escalation (Drews, 1993),
and humans will back down in the face of both formidable and
prestigious opponents (Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 2013), will
acquiesce to their demands (Nelissen & Meijers, 2011), and will
otherwise avoid conflict with them (Jenson & Peterson, 2011).
HS individual are expected to face a lower risk of retaliation
after moralistically punishing (Gordon et al., 2014). Thus, while
in principle the reputation benefits of punishment are open to all,
only HS individuals are realistically able to access them.
Finally, reasoning about status hierarchies is a core part of
human and nonhuman social cognition (Cummins, 2005;
Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011), and
an organism should, if possible, avoid conflicts that have a
small likelihood of success (Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973).
There are penalties for getting into such conflicts, for example,
continued aggression from the victor (Clutton-Brock & Parker,
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1995). Thus, as with any antagonistic encounter, we expect that
moralistic punishment will be seen by observers in the context
of status contests. In fact, if punishers are preferred because
punishment signals prosocial qualities, then individuals should
respond to consistency in the behavior (e.g., Sza´mado´, 2011):
All things being equal, status provides a consistent mechanism
for lowering the cost of punishment, and observers should be
sensitive to this when making judgments about punishers.
Current Studies: Status and Observer Opinions of
Punishers
We argue that only HS individuals can realistically access the
reputation benefits from punishment insomuch as low-status
(LS) individuals are unlikely to intervene, or at least are not
expected to. Study 1 investigated whether the reputation ben-
efits of moralistic punishment are indeed confined to those in
an HS position. Specifically, Study 1 investigated whether
observers expect HS or LS individuals to punish, and what
effect these expectations have on any reputation generated
from punishment.
Study 2 investigated an additional aspect of the relationship
between status and reputation. If, as we argue, HS is a prere-
quisite for punishment, then HS individuals potentially have
access to an additional benefit, maintaining their HS position.
Individuals prefer an environment where ‘‘someone’’ can pun-
ish (Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006) and will transfer
power to individuals who are willing to punish noncooperation
(Gross, Me´der, Okamoto-Barth, & Riedl, 2016). Yet the ben-
efits of HS, for example, a greater say in-group decision mak-
ing, are often dependent on continuing to be a good social
partner (von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2008). Thus, any
asymmetry in status may be accepted only as long as one is
useful; punishing may be the price of occupying an HS position
within a group. Study 2 specifically investigated the conse-
quences that (not) punishing had on the reputation and status
of HS/LS individuals.
Study 1
Gordon, Madden, and Lea (2014) found that punishment can be
seen as a dominant act and that HS lowered the perceived risk
of retaliation. Using the same experimental vignette method,
Study 1 expands this past research in two key ways. Firstly, the
current study allowed participants to make an active prediction
about the outcome of any conflict based on the social status of
the punisher. Secondly, it varied the status of the punisher and
target. Doing both, these can potentially provide evidence that
status is part of any judgments made about punishment and
punishers. We predict that participants will only expect HS third
parties to punish, although participants may expect third parties
to punish less if the antisocial individual is also HS. We also
predict that any reputational benefits will be a downstream result
of the outcome participants predicted, that is, any effect that our
manipulations of status may have on reputation will be mediated
by how participants predicted the outcome of the scenario.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Exeter via a
web-based recruitment system. A total of 119 participants, 26
males (M age ¼ 24) and 93 females (M age ¼ 20) with an
overall age range of 18–46 completed the questionnaire. As
an incentive, participants who completed the survey were
entered into a prize draw for one of several £20 (US$36) store
vouchers. No participants failed the manipulation checks (see
Manipulation checks and demographic questions).
Material and Method
The survey was administered online. Participants followed an
e-mail link, which randomly assigned them to one of the four
conditions and were presented with a survey consisting of three
sections. The first section presented participants with an
experimental vignette and the second section collected partici-
pants’ responses to the vignette. The third section collected
demographic information and contained the manipulation
check questions. The survey was presented to participants in
the order shown later.
Experimental Vignettes
Participants were asked to imagine themselves as part of a local
sports team, who, following an evening practice session, had
retired to a local bar. The team had occupied a table, but there
were not enough seats for everyone. Therefore, some members,
including the participant, had to stand. Nearby, two strangers
were sitting at another table and after a fewminutes, one of them
clearly headed to the bar to order drinks. Seeing this, one of the
standing members of the team (the ‘‘transgressor’’) went over to
the table and proceeded to take the now vacant chair, dismissing
the objections of the still-seated stranger. When the transgressor
returned with the chair, another member of the group (the ‘‘third
party’’) was described as being visibly angered by this behavior.
The scenario ended there without describing how this third
party responded to the norm violation. Third party is used here
to denote proximate disinterest insomuch as neither they nor an
associate were harmed by the antisocial behavior.
The status of both the chair taker (the transgressor) and the
other team member (the third party) was manipulated. Depend-
ing on the condition, each was described as either ‘‘a popular
and skilled player’’ (HS) or ‘‘an unpopular and unskilled
player’’ (LS), giving the study a 2 2 between-subjects design.
Social Perception Questions
Following the scenario, participants were asked to indicate
‘‘what happened next’’ from one of the three choices. They
were asked to indicate whether they believed the third party
would intervene successfully, with the transgressor returning
the chair; the third party would intervene unsuccessfully, with
the transgressor keeping the chair; or the third party would not
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intervene at all. The former two options stated that ‘‘after a brief
exchange, the chair taker . . . [did/did not return the chair],’’ that
is to say it was not specified whether the intervention involved
physical or social threats (see Gordon et al., 2014).
Participants were asked a series of questions regarding how
likable the third party was. They were asked to rate the third
party on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) as
to how trustworthy, group focused, and ‘‘nice’’ they were, and
whether they would work and socialize with the third party.
These five questions had a high reliability index (Cronbach’s a
¼ .87). Therefore, they were collapsed into a single ‘‘likabil-
ity’’ variable for all future analyses.
Participants then answered a further set of questions con-
cerning how dominant they perceived the third party to be.
Participants rated on a scale of 1–7 (1 ¼ strongly disagree, 7
¼ strongly agree), on how threatening, intimidating, dominant,
antagonistic, or aggressive they perceived the third party to be.
These five questions had a high reliability index (a ¼ .86) and
were therefore collapsed into a single ‘‘dominance’’ variable
for all future analyses. Finally, participants were asked to indi-
cate, on a scale of 1 (not likely at all) to 7 (extremely likely),
how likely it was that the transgressor would try and ‘‘get
even’’ with the third party then or at a later date (retaliate).
Manipulation Checks and Demographic Questions
Participants were then asked the two comprehension questions.
They were asked to indicate, from a choice of ‘‘popular and
skilled,’’ ‘‘unpopular and unskilled,’’ or ‘‘sort of popular and
skilled,’’ how the transgressor and the third party were
described in the scenario. Finally, participants indicated their
age, sex, and nationality.
Statistical Analysis
The data were analyzed using SPSS 22. The outcome data were
analyzed using a generalized linear model and all other data
using analysis of variance (ANOVA). The mediation analyses
were conducted using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012).
Results
Outcome
Participants were first asked to indicate ‘‘what happened next’’:
whether the third party successfully intervened, unsuccessfully
intervened, or failed to intervene. As shown in Figure 1, parti-
cipants believed that an HS third party would successfully
intervene and that a subordinate third party was unlikely to
intervene at all (Wald w21 ¼ 18.33, p < .001). As also shown
in Figure 1, the rank of the transgressor also affected perceived
outcome, with participants believing that a third party would be
less likely to intervene when the transgressor was HS (Wald w21
¼ 5.03, p ¼ .025). Perceived outcome was not significantly
affected by an interaction between the status of the third party
and the transgressor (Wald w21 ¼ 1.27, p ¼ .26). However,
Figure 2 does suggest that while the status of the transgressor
was important in the perceived outcomes, this was more the
case when the third party was subordinate.
Likability
The status of the third party did not significantly affect their
likability, F(1, 115) ¼ 2.57, p ¼ .11; however, the third party
was less well liked when the transgressor was HS (M¼ 4.6, SD
¼ 1.2) than when the transgressor was LS, M ¼ 5.0, SD ¼ 0.9;
F(1, 115) ¼ 4.57, p ¼ .035). The likability of the third party
was not significantly affected by an interaction between the
status’ of the third party and the transgressor, F(1, 115) ¼
0.98, p ¼ .75).
A separate ANOVA was conducted using ‘‘outcome’’ as an
independent variable. How participants predicted the outcome
of the scenario had a strong effect on likability, F(2, 116) ¼
4.11, p¼ .019), with participants liking the third party who was
predicted to be successful in their intervention (M ¼ 5.1,
Figure 1. Predicted outcome of third-party punishment depending on (a) the rank of the third party or (b) the rank of the aggressor (white ¼
successful intervention, gray ¼ unsuccessful intervention, and black ¼ no intervention).
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SD ¼ 1.1) more than those predicted to be unsuccessful
(M ¼ 4.7, SD ¼ 1.1) or predicted to not intervene (M ¼ 4.5,
SD ¼ 0.9). This might explain why participants liked the third
party who punished an LS transgressor more, as successful
punishment was seen to be less likely when directed against
an HS transgressor (see Figure 1). Therefore, a mediation anal-
ysis was conducted with outcome as the mediating variable.3
With the status of the third party controlled for, the predicted
outcome completely mediated the relationship between the sta-
tus of the transgressor and the likability of the third party
(b ¼ 0.08, BCa 95% CI [0.03, 0.24], on 5,000 samples), with
the status of the transgressor no longer significantly affecting
likability (b ¼ 0.34, t ¼ 1.73, p ¼ .09). That is to say, the
transgressor’s status affected participant’s likability ratings only
insomuch as that status predicted the outcome of the scenario.
Dominance
As shown in Figure 3, unsurprisingly the third party was per-
ceived to be more dominant when described as HS as opposed
to subordinate, F(1, 115)¼ 16.18, p < .001. The third party was
also marginally perceived to be more dominant when the
transgressor they faced was described as LS, F(1, 115) ¼
3.64, p ¼ .059; Figure 3. The perceived dominance of the
third party was not significantly affected by an interaction
between the status of the third party and the transgressor,
F(1, 115) ¼ 0.24, p ¼ .63.
A separate ANOVA was conducted using outcome as an
independent variable. As with likability, how participants pre-
dicted the outcome had a strong effect on perceived dominance,
F(2, 116) ¼ 9.89, p < .001, with successful third parties being
seen as more dominant (M ¼ 3.8, SD ¼ 1.2) than unsuccessful
(M ¼ 3.0, SD ¼ 1.1) or nonintervening (M ¼ 2.8, SD ¼ 1.1)
third parties. With the status of the transgressor controlled for,
the predicted outcome partially mediated the relationship
between the status of the third party and their perceived
dominance (b ¼ 0.23, BCa 95% CI [0.50, 0.08], on
5,000 samples), although the direct relationship between the
two was still present (b ¼ 0.61, t ¼ 2.75, p ¼ .007). That is
to say, participant ratings of dominance were driven by both the
outcome of the scenario, and whether the third party was
described as HS or LS.
Interestingly, with the status of the third party controlled for,
the predicted outcome of the interaction fully mediated the
relationship between the status of the transgressor and the per-
ceived dominance of the third party (b ¼ 0.11, BCa 95% CI
[0.01, 0.31], on 5,000 samples), with transgressor’s status no
longer significantly affecting dominance (b ¼ 0.29, t ¼ 1.40,
p ¼ .17); the effect of the transgressor’s status on dominance
ratings was entirely due to how this status affected the pre-
dicted outcome.
Figure 2. Predicted outcome of third-party punishment depending on the rank of the third party and the aggressor (white ¼ successful
intervention, gray ¼ unsuccessful intervention, and black ¼ no intervention).
Figure 3. The perceived dominance of the third party depending on
the rank of the third party and the aggressor (dominant ¼ white and
subordinate ¼ gray). Error bars ¼ 95% CI.
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Retaliation
We assumed a priori that some participants would select the
‘‘do nothing’’ outcome. Accordingly, the retaliation item asked
participants to ‘‘assume the agitated person [the third party] did
intervene, regardless of your initial decision.’’ Because data
from these participants did not represent their true feelings, the
analysis was run after removing participants who indicated that
the third party would not intervene. As shown in Figure 4,
while individually the status of the third party, F(1, 67) ¼
0.005, p ¼ .94, and the transgressor, F(1, 67) ¼ 0.008, p ¼
.93, did not affect the perceived risk of retaliation, retaliation
was affected by an interaction between the two, F(1, 67) ¼
4.08, p ¼ .047); participants who predicted the third party
would intervene felt that retaliation was more likely when the
third party confronted an transgressor of equal status.
Discussion
Study 1 investigated whether the status of both an antisocial
individual and a third party would affect how observers pre-
dicted the outcome of an act of moralistic punishment, and
whether their relative status would have an impact on any
subsequent reputational benefit. This was shown to be the case.
The status of the belligerents was considered important by
participants, with the rank of the third party influencing a
‘‘successful’’ outcome the most. While this is not surprising
as such, it does support the suggestion made by Gordon et al.
(2014) that subordinates might not be expected to intervene at
all. Importantly, the pattern of predicted outcomes as shown in
Figure 2 suggests that participants believed a punishing group
member would either intervene successfully or not at all.
These results should be seen in the context of experimental
punishment games, as in such games punishment is always
successful insomuch as punish decisions always inflict costs
on the target. We have suggested that only HS individuals are
willing to punish because they can do so effectively due to
physical formidability or social support; the fact that partici-
pants expected only HS individuals would confront antisocial
behavior supports this conjecture.
Furthermore, any reputation, as either an amiable or intimi-
dating individual (e.g., Barclay, 2006; Brandt et al., 2003; Rai-
hani & Bshary, 2015), was dependent on a successful outcome
for the punisher, which in turn was dependent on the status of
the punisher and transgressor. While individuals prefer envir-
onments where punishment occurs (Gu¨rerk et al., 2006), and
thus might prefer punishers for the protection they afford, it is
important that an individual can maintain their behavior (e.g.,
see dos Santos & Wedekind, 2015; Sza´mado´, 2011). A subor-
dinate may land, physically or metaphorically, a ‘‘lucky
punch’’ but would be unlikely able to fend off the immediate
retaliation or any subsequent feuds (e.g., Nikiforakis & Engel-
mann, 2011). Thus, there is a barrier to accessing the reputation
benefits from punishment. As suggested by the results, this
barrier can only be overcome by someone in an HS position.
Finally, there was some evidence that the punishment sce-
nario was itself perceived in the context of a dominance/status
contest. It was expected that retaliation risk would correspond
to relative rank, that is, that a dominant punisher would face
lower risk from a subordinate transgressor than a dominant one
and that a subordinate punisher would face a greater risk from a
dominant transgressor than a subordinate one. In fact, the risk
of retaliation was perceived to be greater when the belligerents
were of equal rank (Figure 4). This makes sense if participants
perceived the encounter as a status contest rather than as a
(purely) moralistic act as, within social hierarchies, conflict
escalation should occur more between those of similar ranks
(Stulp, Kordsmeyer, Buunk, & Verhulst, 2012; Wilson, 1980,
pp. 141–142). Interestingly, the finding above was partly mir-
rored in a recent paper on punishment heterogeneity that found
weak players were less likely to receive retaliation from stron-
ger players (Bone, Wallace, Bshary, & Raihani, 2015),
although here strong players were retaliated against by both
player types. Additionally, while the framing of the belligerents
as teammates could make retaliation unlikely, in real-life situa-
tions similar to the scenario, the opposite is true (Levine, Lowe,
Best, & Heim, 2012). Thus, participant’s belief about retalia-
tion risk likely conforms to their real-life expectations
experiences.
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that HS individuals can access the rep-
utation benefits from punishment. However, any ambiguity in
motive makes a punisher ‘‘feared’’ rather than ‘‘loved’’ (Rai-
hani & Bshary, 2015), and nonpunishing cooperators are more
Figure 4. The perceived risk of retaliation against a successful or
unsuccessful intervention depending on the rank of the third party and
the aggressor (dominant aggressor¼white and subordinate aggressor
¼ gray). Error bars ¼ 95% CI.
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well liked than punishers (Jordan et al., 2016; Kiyonari &
Barclay, 2008; Przepiorka & Liebe, 2015). Furthermore,
whether any positive sentiment translates into physical gains
is equivocal (Balafoutas, Nikiforakis, & Rockenbach, 2014;
Nelissen, 2008). Thus, while Study 1 demonstrated that HS
individuals are expected to punish, an important question is
why they would be willing to punish?
One possible reason would be to maintain an HS position
within a group. A HS position comes with intrinsic benefits
(see Chapais, 2015; Rege, 2008), and while individuals prefer
environments where punishment occurs (Gu¨rerk et al., 2006),
we dislike disadvantageous inequality (e.g., Leibbrandt &
Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2011) and especially dislike individuals who
become ‘‘too’’ domineering (Boehm & Boehm, 1999). Poten-
tially, punishment may be the price of an HS position, that is,
individuals are allowed to occupy a prominent position as long
as some of their social power is used prosocially. In a number
of nonstate societies, for example, a leadership position comes
with the assumption that the leader will take part in dangerous
activities (for a review, see Glowacki & von Rueden, 2015).
Study 2 was designed to test this suggestion by giving
participants the option to remove the HS group member from
a position of power. We predicted that HS individuals who
didn’t punish would lose their status. We also predicted that
any decisions observers made about punishers would be
mediated by how advantageous observers perceived an HS
position to be.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Exeter (75)
and the University of Dundee (42) via an e-mail advertisement
sent to the undergraduate mailing lists. A total of 117 partici-
pants, 35 males (M age¼ 26), 82 females (M age¼ 23) with an
overall age range of 18–52 completed the questionnaire. As an
incentive, participants who completed the survey were entered
into a prize draw for one of several £20 (US$32) store vou-
chers. There were no significant differences in the measured
variables between the two institutions and, therefore, they were
analyzed as one cohort. An additional 12 participants were
excluded for failing at least one manipulation check (see
Manipulation checks and demographic questions).
Materials and Procedure
The survey was administered online. Participants followed an
e-mail link, which randomly assigned participants to one of the
four conditions. They were then presented with a survey con-
sisting of three sections. The first section presented participants
with an experimental vignette and the second section collected
participants’ responses to the vignette. The third section col-
lected demographic information and contained the manipula-
tion check questions. The survey was presented to participants
in the order shown later.
Experimental Vignettes
It was necessary to alter the scenario to a situation where the
position of the HS individual was mutable (rather than a formal
hierarchy such as one may find in an office) but was also
‘‘realistic’’ in the sense of Study 1 (no scenarios involving
kings or revolutions). The scenario was therefore identical to
that in Study 1 except for alterations in three areas. Firstly,
participants were asked to imagine themselves as part of a
university society, rather than a sports club. Secondly, the sta-
tus of the third party was manipulated by describing them as
either the current society president (HS) or a new member (LS).
‘‘New member’’ was used to suggest no group authority with-
out providing personal information, such as ‘‘unpopular.’’
Thirdly, any description of skill was removed as expertise is
often valued over prosocial behavior (see von Rueden, Gavri-
lets, & Glowacki, 2015).
Finally, participants were informed whether the third party
actually intervened or did nothing: given the results of Study 1,
it was felt allowing participants to predict the outcome would
yield an insufficient spread of responses to make comparisons
between status and (lack of) intervention.
Social Perception Questions
Following the vignette, participants read that their society
would be electing a new president soon. However, in order to
run, a candidate had to be nominated anonymously by several
society members first. Participants were asked how likely they
would be to nominate the third party, on a scale of 1 (definitely
nominate someone else) to 7 (definitely nominate the current
president/new member).
Participants were then asked the same likability and dom-
inance questions as in from Study 1. Both sets had a high
reliability index (likable a ¼ .89; dominant a ¼ .84) and were
collapsed into single ‘‘likability’’ and ‘‘dominant’’ variables for
all future analyses.
Participants were then asked whether they believed the
transgressor in the vignette would try and ‘‘get even’’ with
the third party (retaliate), on a scale of 1 (not at all likely) to 7
(very likely).
We hypothesized that any relationship between status and
punishment might be conditional on the benefit an HS individ-
ual extracts from that position. Therefore, participants were
asked whether they believed the position of president was ben-
eficial to the holder. These items were produced to reflect both
the realities of a student society and the nonmaterial rewards
leaders receive in nonstate societies (Glowacki & von Rueden,
2015). Such a focus can help explain why leadership might
evolve in an environment where material rewards not are sub-
stantial or nonexistent. Participants were asked to respond, on a
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to state-
ments about the position of president that it (a) implicitly came
with ‘‘perks,’’ (b) was a reward in itself, (c) allowed one to help
one’s friends, (d) gave the holder access to opportunities not
open to other members, and (e) whether having ‘‘the final say’’
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on society issues was an advantage of the position. These five
questions had a high reliability index (a ¼ .78) and were col-
lapsed into a single ‘‘advantages’’ variable.
Manipulation Checks and Demographic Questions
Participants were then asked the two manipulation check ques-
tions. They were asked to indicate, from a choice of ‘‘presi-
dent,’’ ‘‘new member,’’ or ‘‘stranger,’’ how the third party was
described in the scenario, and whether the third party ‘‘inter-
vened’’ or ‘‘did nothing.’’ Finally, participants indicated their
age, sex, and nationality.
Statistical analysis. All data were analyzed using ANOVA in
SPSS 22. The mediation analyses were conducted using the
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012).
Results
Third-Party Punishment and Social Position
As shown by Figure 5, participants were far more willing to
nominate the third party if they were labeled as HS, F(1, 113)¼
9.04, p ¼ .003, and, separately, if the third party intervened
rather than did nothing, F(1, 113) ¼ 45.65, p < .001. As also
shown in Figure 5, willingness to nominate the third party was
affected by an interaction between status and intervention, F(1,
113) ¼ 5.76, p ¼ .018; while nonintervention resulted in indif-
ference to nominating the third party regardless of status, pun-
ishing HS third parties were far more likely to be nominated
compared to LS punishers.
An analysis was conducted to investigate whether the
‘‘Advantages’’ (M ¼ 4.6) variable mediated the relationship
between status, intervention, and the willingness to nominate
the third party. A mediation effect of Advantages did not occur
(b ¼ 0.03, t ¼ 0.24, p ¼ .98, 95% CI [0.5, 0.4]), that is,
belief about the advantages of the president’s position did not
affect participant responses to the manipulations.
Social responses to third party. As with Study 1, participants were
also asked how likable and dominant they perceived the third
party to be. As with Study 1, intervening third parties were seen
as more likable, intervened, M ¼ 5.2, SD ¼ 1.1; did nothing,
M ¼ 4.4, SD ¼ 1.0; F(1, 113) ¼ 16.50, p < .001, but this
perception was not affected by status, HS, M ¼ 4.9, SD ¼ 1.1;
LS, M ¼ 4.7, SD ¼ 1.0; F(1, 113) ¼ 2.39, p ¼ .13, or any
interaction of status and intervention, F(1, 113) ¼ 0.29,
p ¼ .59. Likability correlated with nomination (r ¼ 0.32,
n¼ 117, p < .001) and partially mediated the relationship between
the success of the third party and willingness to nominate
(b ¼ 0.17, BCa 95% CI [0.40, 0.01], on 5,000 samples),
although the direct relationship between the two was still present
(b ¼ 1.26, t ¼ 5.17, p < .001), that is, the nomination results
was not just an effect of participants ‘‘liking’’ the successful
punishers.
Equally, intervening parties were seen as more dominant,
intervened,M¼ 2.9, SD¼ 1.1; did nothing,M¼ 2.4, SD¼ 1.2;
F(1, 113)¼ 5.02, p¼ .027, but this perception was not affected
by status, HS,M ¼ 2.7, SD ¼ 1.0; LS,M ¼ 2.7, SD ¼ 1.2; F(1,
113)¼ 0.18, p¼ .67, or any interaction of the two, F(1, 113)¼
1.83, p ¼ .18. Dominance correlated with nomination (r ¼ .24,
N ¼ 117, p ¼ .01); however, dominance did not mediate the
relationship between intervention and nomination (b ¼ 0.08,
BCa 95% CI [0.27, 0.004], on 5,000 samples).
Thus, while the observers willingness to nominate the third
party (confer/maintain status) was affected by an interaction
between the latter’s status and their actions, reputation was
affected by the action of the third party alone.
Retaliation
The perceived threat of retaliation was not affected by the
status of the third party, HS, M ¼ 3.7, SD ¼ 1.5; LS, M ¼
3.9, SD ¼ 1.6; F(1, 113) ¼ 0.94, p ¼ .33, their intervention,
intervened,M¼ 3.6, SD¼ 1.6; did nothing,M¼ 4.1, SD¼ 1.5;
F(1, 113) ¼ 0.18, p ¼ .08, or an interaction between the two,
F(1, 113) ¼ 0.29, p ¼ .59. Nor was the relationship between
these factors and the perceived threat of retaliation mediated by
any other variables.
Discussion
Study 2 investigated whether maintaining an HS position was
dependent on moralistic punishment. On the core metric, will-
ingness to nominate the third party, participants were more
willing to vote for HS individuals who punished antisocial
behavior. This, along with the likability and dominance ratings,
suggests that moralistic punishment could be an effective
mechanism to recruit and maintain social allies. While Study
1 and previous studies have shown that punishers are seen as
dominant and likable, the current study suggests that the act of
punishment can lead an individual to be given, or rather
Figure 5. Likelihood of voting for the third party (punished ¼ white
and failed to punish ¼ gray). Error bars ¼ 95% CI.
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allowed to keep, a formal position of leadership. Punishment is
seen as the price for power.
Importantly, while participants were willing to nominate
anyone who punished, the greatest difference in nominations
was between HS punishers and nonpunishers (Figure 5). HS
individuals are often expected to take on risky tasks as part of
their position (von Rueden et al., 2015) and our result suggests
that not only are HS individuals thought likely to punish (Study
1), but that their position becomes more precarious if they fail
to act for the public good. Recently, it has been suggested that
weaker individuals expect benevolent behavior from stronger
individuals as a response to the fear of exploitation (Schilke,
Reimann, & Cook, 2015). Instead, such expectations of proso-
ciality could be seen as monitoring for behaviors that, if not
conducted, would trigger a revolutionary coalition against a
leader who attempts to behave too selfishly (Boehm & Boehm,
1999; see also, Van De Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2010).
Thus, punishment by HS individuals may not be so much a
case of the exploitation of the big by the small (Olson, 1965),
but a trading of gains by the latter (cost-free cooperative envi-
ronment) for gains by the former (the inherent advantages of
HS within a social group). Indeed, the primary currency that
leadership earns may be prestige (Price & Van Vugt, 2014),
and our result suggests this can be taken away if a leader fails to
moralistically punish.
We also hypothesized that the advantages that participants
believed were part of an HS position would affect any reaction
to (a lack of) moralistic punishment. This proved not to be the
case. Two related possible explanations are as follows: parti-
cipants did not value the advantages they believed the president
of the society had or the advantages were not seen as being to
the detriment of subordinates. Had the president received, for
example, additional material advantages for their position
(e.g., receiving a greater share of resources, which can pro-
voke spiteful responses, Burns & Visser, 2006), or had parti-
cipants observed one of the advantages in action (e.g., self-
serving decision), then the advantages of an HS position
might have produced an effect (e.g., Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart,
& De Cremer, 2004).
Finally, status did not significantly affect the likelihood of
retaliation. One explanation is the relative lack of social infor-
mation provided by our scenario. Study 2 specifically chose to
avoid explicit reference to physical or social attributes (e.g.,
sports skill4 and popularity in Study 1). Physical attributes
influence a variety of social decisions that, logically, they have
no connection to in modern societies (von Rueden & van Vugt,
2015), and any confrontation of a norm violation at least has the
potential to turn violent (see Levine, Taylor, & Best, 2011).
Equally, coalitional support is also a key metric when the out-
come of any contest is considered (e.g., Pun, Birch, & Baron,
2016). Nevertheless, our manipulation of status did imply
social support. The variation in retaliation results between
Studies 1, 2, and previous research (Gordon et al., 2014) could
suggest that, if separated sufficiently, formidability and pres-
tige may result in different expectations of punishers and
punishment.
General Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that any reputation generated from mor-
alistic punishment is dependent on success, which itself is
dependent on the status of the punisher. Study 2 found that
punishment led to HS punishers maintaining their position and
that a failure to punish led to this position being at risk. The
willingness to grant punishers an HS position was also partially
independent of how ‘‘liked’’ they were by participants. The
results suggest that only HS individuals are expected to mor-
alistically punish (Study1) and that the reputation benefits are
strongly liked to status (Studies 1 and 2). Taken together, these
results suggest the reputation of punishers is fundamentally tied
to reasoning about social hierarchies.
Punishment and Reputation
In both studies, the reputation gained from punishment, as
either a prosocial or intimidating individual (Barclay, 2006;
Brandt et al., 2003; Raihani & Bshary, 2015), was dependent
on a successful outcome of punishment, which in turn was
dependent on the status of the punisher and transgressor (in
Study 1). As stated previously, while individuals prefer envir-
onments where punishment occurs (Gu¨rerk et al., 2006), it
would be a mistake to join a group where the punishing indi-
vidual could not act consistently in such a manner. In fact, the
results of Study 2 suggest that the likelihood of consistent
behavior is important, as HS individuals were more likely to
be nominated when they successfully punished, compared to
successful LS individuals. In Study 2, subordinate individuals
were less likely to be nominated, even though successful inter-
vention increased likability and perceived dominance across all
status conditions (as in Study 1), and in Study 1, they were not
expected to punish at all. A subordinate can still gain reputation
from successfully punishing, yet the nomination result suggests
participants were unwilling to grant LS punishers any author-
ity. Thus, while punishment might not be a way to the top, it is a
mechanism to remain there.
The fact that any reputation benefits afforded to punishers by
observers were dependent on success, which was in turn depen-
dent on status, should be stressed. By design, all punishment in
economic experiments is successful, and this is not what indi-
viduals expect to occur in real social conflicts (see also Levine
et al., 2011). While research has been concerned with down-
stream effects of successful punishment, on reputation (Nelissen,
2008), the behavior of free riders (Masclet, 2003), or group
efficiency (Ga¨chter et al., 2008), there has been no consideration
that the attempt at punishment might fail and therefore of what
determines success or failure, that is, who punishes successfully?
The current studies demonstrate that, in the perceptions of
observers at least, only punishment by HS individuals is likely
to (a) succeed and (b) occur at all. Thus, past experiments are, in
effect, investigating the behavior of individuals in an HS posi-
tion, without recognizing that fact. While anger at an act of
antisocial behavior might be ubiquitous, the ability to act upon
it is realistically limited to powerful individuals.
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Sex Effects
Our samples were heavily weighted toward females, but we
made an a priori decision not to investigate sex differences.
Firstly, a number of reviews (Cummins, 2005; Hawley, 2014;
Hawley, Little, & Card, 2008) have suggested that sex differ-
ences in status seeking and contests have been overestimated.
Males and females show similar behavior in conflict over
resources (Griskevicius et al., 2009), in same-sex confronta-
tions (Felson, 1982), and similar self-serving biases related to
physical strength (Sell et al., 2009). Secondly, our studies con-
cerned the perception of punishers rather than the act itself.
Fundamentally, it is in the best interests of both males and
females to (a) monitor the social environment and respond to
events within it (Cummins, 1996, 1999) and (b) to recognize
the cost/benefits of associating with certain individuals, for
example, punishers.
This is not to say sex could not have had any effects:
Females may prefer to establish status more covertly (Cum-
mins, 2005), may value status differently to males depending
on the circumstance (Snyder et al., 2011), and typical asymme-
tries in strength mean females may be less likely to actually
punish outside of the laboratory (Levine et al., 2011; Parks,
Osgood, Felson, Wells, & Graham, 2013). However, the inves-
tigation of such phenomena is beyond the aims of the current
study. For the reasons mentioned earlier, we believe the
female-biased participant pool did not affect the results of the
current study or could detract from its conclusions.
Why Punish? Status and the Evolution of Punishment
Status influenced how observers perceive punishers and pun-
ishment. We suggest that status has a greater role in the evolu-
tion of punishment than just providing a proximate mechanism
to overcome the immediate costs.
Firstly, status and social hierarchies are a core part of human
social cognition (Hawley, 2014; Thomsen et al., 2011), and the
need to out-maneuver one’s rivals is a compelling explanation
for the evolution of human intelligence (Byrne & Whiten,
1997; Dunbar, 1998; Jensen, 2010). It has been argued that
dominance/status hierarchies, therefore, represent a set of basic
implicit social norms (Cummins, 1996, 2005). As such, it is in
the best interests of individuals, especially HS ones, to recog-
nize when these rules are violated (Brosnan, 2011) and to pun-
ish others when violations occur (Clutton-Brock & Parker,
1995; Cummins, 1999). Indeed, we make ‘‘fair’’ decisions
based on self-interest (DeScioli, Massenkoff, Shaw, Petersen,
& Kurzban, 2014), and an HS position affects what is consid-
ered ‘‘fair’’ behavior (Pratto, Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 1999;
Sell et al., 2009). So in this regard alone, we should expect
‘‘moralistic’’ punishment and status to be closely associated.
Secondly, and more importantly, in human, and some non-
human (De Waal, 1982/2007) societies, status is not just based
on physical formidability but on social coalitions and political
power (von Rueden et al., 2008). Coalitional aggression has a
long history in human evolution (see Pietraszewski, Cosmides,
& Tooby, 2014) and such aggression is often directed at indi-
viduals who are ‘‘too powerful’’ (Boehm & Boehm, 1999).
Therefore, moralistic punishment provides a mechanism by
which an individual can exert their status (Brandt et al.,
2003; Gordon et al., 2014), but at the same time act as in a
group beneficial way and thus be seen as ‘‘useful.’’ Indeed,
nonpunishers can benefit greatly from free riding on punish-
ment (Roberts, 2013). This was highlighted by the nomination
data, as this results was partially independent of likability;
when deciding on a leader, competence—here the ability and
willingness to punish—overrides any fear or envy observing
punishment may generate.
Furthermore, while the current studies focused on hetero-
geneity in costs between individual punishers, punishment is
often the result of coordinated group activity (see Guala, 2012).
Nevertheless, individuals are needed to spearhead this coordi-
nation, and the attributes associated with an HS position (per-
sonal formidability, social support, etc.) would make
coordination less risky and cheaper for such an individual
(e.g., Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010). Participants, we expect,
would likely react equally as negatively to an HS individual
who did not coordinate punishment, as they did to one who did
not punish. After all, such coordinating of group activity is
expected of a leader (von Rueden et al., 2014), and leaders
often pay immediate costs for this (Gavrilets, 2015). As stated
earlier, punishment may be the price of an HS position.
The idea that punishment acts to justify an HS position is, at
this point, entirely speculative. However, HS individuals cer-
tainly, both experimentally (Maner & Mead, 2010) and theore-
tically (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Powers & Lehmann,
2014), behave prosocially when it furthers their own ends.
Even without commenting on how status can affect direct
benefit from enforcing cooperation (Raihani, Grutter, &
Bshary, 2010; Singh & Boomsma, 2015; von Rueden & van
Vugt, 2015), our status-based explanation for moralistic pun-
ishment provides the behavior with clear individual, condition-
dependent, indirect benefits.
Conclusion
Recent studies on punishment have discursively acknowledged
the role that interindividual differences in status might have in
off-setting the costs of punishment. Specific emphasis has been
placed on how the advantages of HS or dominant position
relate to mechanisms in behavioral experiments, for example,
the ability to punish effectively or retaliation risk (e.g., Bone
et al., 2015; Roberts, 2013). This is in agreement with the
anthropological literature where, whether formally recognized
as ‘‘leaders’’ or not, it is HS individuals who tend to engage in
punishment (for a review, see Glowacki & von Rueden, 2015).
The current studies found that HS individuals were expected to
punish (Study 1), HS individuals faced a greater risk of revo-
lution should they fail to punish (Study 2), and the perceived
risk of retaliation reflected status contests (Study 1). These
results suggest that the perception of punishers and punishment
is imbedded in the social cognition of status and reflects an
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underlying strategy to remain in an HS position by demonstrat-
ing ‘‘usefulness’’ as a powerful yet benevolent ally: If the
dilemma of leadership is how to gain (and maintain) ascen-
dancy over others and simultaneously win their approval (Blau,
1964), our results suggest moralistic punishment is a good way
for this to be achieved.
Human history, and indeed the human present, is filled with
examples of individuals and groups claiming that their ability
to ‘‘protect us from threats’’ justifies their position. Thus, our
reasoning also has an intuitive logic about the function of, and
motivation for, ‘‘moralistically’’ punishing antisocial behavior.
We suggest that moralistic punishment evolved as a strategic
behavior, in the context of greater coalitional aggression, to
maintain status by demonstrating physical or social formidabil-
ity, while at the same time acting in a ‘‘pro social’’ way that
will not trigger group fission or revolution. We suggest that a
focus on the status of punishers, for instance, by manipulating
direct or indirect cues of status or leadership in experiments,
would be a fruitful area of study. Equally, given the relation-
ship between reputation and success, a more explicit study of
whether a subordinate could in fact ‘‘punish their way to the
top’’ would also expand on the ideas put forward in this article.
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Notes
1. While punishment in, for example, a public goods game (e.g., Fehr
& Ga¨chter, 2000) can be seen as different from punishment by a
‘‘disinterested’’ third party (e.g., Pedersen, Kurzban, & McCul-
lough, 2013), both fundamentally describe the opportunistic—that
is, not in response to direct antagonism—punishment of social
norm violations. While ‘‘costly punishment’’ covers both these (see
Guala, 2012), any realization of these costs may be conditional
(Gordon et al., 2014) and given the vignette nature of the current
studies, ‘‘costly’’ might be misleading. Thus, ‘‘moralistic’’ is used
as a convenient short hand for any punishment of norm violations.
2. While formidability (individual fighting strength) and prestige
(social regard) are conceptually different (see Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001), in reality they can be hard to disentangle (Cheng,
Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). For example, in
nonstate societies, one impacts the other (e.g., von Rueden et al.,
2008) and in modern societies, they cause similar behavioral
effects from others (e.g., Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 2013). For the
sake of clarity and simplicity, and because our aim is not to tackle
this issue per se, we will use ‘‘status’’ as a label, as it reflects our
concept across various fields of biology and psychology (see
Cheng et al., 2013, table 1).
3. Analyses carried out using linear regressions suggest that the ‘‘out-
come’’ categories produce a graded response and can, therefore, be
considered as a ‘‘scale of intervention,’’ from likelihood of no
intervention to certain success.
4. We would argue that being labeled as ‘‘good at sport’’ implies one
is physically fit/strong.
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